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Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the behaviour that motivates individuals to engage in the
shadow economy. Results show that those who fear being caught by tax authorities are
less likely to supply or purchase work in the shadow economy. Further, those who earn
more money in the ‘official’ economy, work less in the shadow economy, but purchase
more shadow economy work. The results of logistic regressions show that when working
in the shadow economy is seen as socially acceptable, shadow economy activities are
higher.
Additional findings showed that, on average, a shadow economy worker earned
AUS$2135.31 during 2000, and households spent AUS$2293.00 for these services. Using
micro-data to calculate an overall aggregate figure for the estimated size of the shadow
economy in Australia during 2000, it was found that between 4.81% and 8.8% of the
gross national income (GNI) was earned in the shadow economy.
1Individual behaviour in Australia’s shadow economy: Facts, empirical findings and
some mysteries
Friedrich Schneider1, Valerie Braithwaite and Monika Reinhart
1. Introduction
Crime and other underground economic activities (including the shadow economy) are a fact
of life around the world and most societies attempt to control these activities through various
measures such as punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education. Gathering
statistics about who is engaged in underground (or criminal) activities, the frequency with
which these activities occur, and the magnitude of such activities, is crucial for making
effective and efficient decisions regarding the allocation of a country’s resources. Given that
the individuals who are engaged in such behaviour do not want to be identified, it is difficult
to obtain accurate information about the nature and extent of these underground activities.
There is also little understanding about what motivates individuals to work in the shadow
economy or to request such work.
Although much literature2 has been published on single aspects of the hidden economy, and a
comprehensive survey has been written by Schneider and Enste (2000), the subject is still
quite controversial - compare for example arguments in the feature titled ‘Controversy: on
the Hidden Economy’ in the Economic Journal Vol. 109, 1999. There are disagreements
about what constitutes a shadow economic activity, the procedures used to estimate the size
of the shadow economy as well as on the use of these estimates in economic and policy
analysis (for example, the opinions of Tanzi 1999, Thomas 1999 and Giles 1999).
In spite of differing views and continuing debates, there are strong indications that the
shadow economy is growing around the world. The size, the causes and the consequences of
this increase vary between countries, but there are some comparisons which may be of
                                                
1 This paper was written while Friedrich Schneider visited the Australian National University in February 2001.
We would like to thank Tina Murphy for her assistance in the preparation of this manuscript.
2 The literature about the ‘shadow’, ‘underground’, ‘informal’, ‘second’, ‘cash’ or ‘parallel’ economy is rapidly
increasing. Various topics on how to measure it, its causes and its effect on the official economy have been
analysed. See for example, the first publications by Tanzi (1982), Frey and Pommerehne (1984), and Feige
(1989); survey related publications by Thomas (1992), Loayza (1996), Pozo (1996), Lippert and Walker (1997),
Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997), and Johnson, Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobatón (1998a); and for an overall survey of the global evidence of its size, Schneider and Enste (2000).
2interest to social scientists and the public, and which might also be helpful to governments
who need to deal with this phenomenon.
There are several important reasons why politicians and public sector officials should be
especially worried about the size and growth of the shadow economy:
(1) If an increase in the shadow economy is caused mainly by a rise in the overall tax and
social security burden, then this may lead to an erosion of the tax and social security
bases and finally to a decrease in tax receipts. This will subsequently lead to a further
increase in the budget deficit, or to a further increase of tax rates with the
consequence of an additional increase in the shadow economy. Therefore an increase
in the shadow economy can be seen as a reaction by individuals who feel
overburdened by State activities.
(2) As the shadow economy increases, economic policy will be based on erroneous
‘official’ indicators (for example, unemployment, official labour force, income,
consumption), or at least indicators that are ‘inaccurate’ in their magnitude. In such a
situation a prospering shadow economy may lead to severe difficulties for politicians
because it ‘causes’ or ‘provides’ unreliable official indicators, and the direction of the
intended policy measures may therefore be questionable.
(3) While an increase in the shadow economy provides strong incentives to domestic and
foreign workers and draws resources away from the official economy, it should be
mentioned that two-thirds of the income earned in the shadow economy is
subsequently returned to the official economy3 (for example, through retail spending)
resulting in a considerable positive effect.
These concerns and the scientific fascination of the underground economy have inspired us to
tackle this difficult question and to undertake the challenging task of providing some
empirical knowledge and insights about why people work in the shadow economy or why
people request such work.
                                                
3 This figure has been derived from polls of the German and Austrian population about the effects of the shadow
economy. For further information see Schneider (1998b). The results of these polls show that two-thirds of the
value added produced in the shadow economy would not be in the official economy if the shadow economy did
not exist.
3Section 2 of this paper presents some basic findings of a survey which asked 7754 Australian
households about their tax paying behaviour, whether they evade their taxes, and whether
they work in the cash economy or request such work. Section 3 presents some preliminary
findings about the factors that might motivate individuals to work (or request work) in the
shadow economy, and Section 4 presents data from a preliminary attempt to calculate
aggregate figures of the Australian shadow economy. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary
of the major empirical findings and the conclusions that can be made from these findings.
2. Some basic survey findings on individual attitudes to the shadow economy
The ‘Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey’ (V. Braithwaite, Australian National
University) was sent to 7754 Australian households in June 2000. It asked respondents a
broad range of questions about their experiences with the Australian Taxation Office (Tax
Office), their tax paying behaviour, cash transaction behaviour, their goals for an Australian
society, and whether they believed the Tax Office acts in accordance with the standards set
out in the Taxpayers’ Charter.4 A response rate of 29% was achieved after adjusting for out
of scope responses, with 2040 households returning a completed questionnaire. Of these
respondents, 118  admitted that they had received cash-in-hand payments in the past 12
months, suggesting that 6.0% of the investigated households work in the shadow economy. In
addition, 283 (or 14.4%) respondents said that they requested and received shadow economy
work (paid cash-in-hand) in the last 12 months while 29 respondents (1.4%) said they both
worked regularly in the shadow economy and hired shadow economy workers.5
Table 1 presents the income earned in the shadow economy, the money spent on shadow
economy activities and the ‘official’ income situation for shadow economy workers and those
who purchase shadow economy work. On average, shadow economy workers earned
AUS$2135.31 a year which is 8.82% in terms of their official income. Of the households that
purchased shadow economy work, an average of AUS$2293.50 was spent annually, or 5.85%
of their ‘official’ income. The average hourly wage earned by a shadow economy worker was
reported as AUS$23.29, while the average amount of money spent for this work was reported
                                                
4 In this paper we will only present the empirical findings with respect to shadow economy attitudes; for other
findings see Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns, and Graham (2001).
5 These figures of shadow economy activities are quite low compared to European results; for example in a
survey in Germany 24% of all respondents worked in the shadow economy and 42.5% hired shadow economy
workers (compare Schneider, 1999).
4as AUS$48.25 an hour. While unlikely, it appears that those purchasing shadow economy
work spend 107% more an hour than a shadow economy worker earns. Table 1 also shows
that shadow economy workers have considerably lower incomes than those who purchase
shadow economy activities, with the average ‘official’ income of a shadow economy worker
being 61.7% of the average ‘official’ income of a person who purchases shadow economy
work.
Table 1: Earned income in the shadow economy, money spent for shadow economy
activities and the ‘official’ income for both shadow economy suppliers and purchasers
Statistics /
Value
Annual
income
earned by
shadow
economy
workers in
AUS$
Hourly
wage of
shadow
economy
workers in
AUS$
Money
spent a
year for
shadow
economy
activities
in AUS$
Money
spent an
hour for
shadow
economy
activities
in AUS$
Annual
‘official’
income of
shadow
economy
workers in
AUS$
Annual
‘official’
income of those
who purchase
shadow
economy work
in AUS$
Mean 2 135.31 23.29 2 293.50 48.25 24 200.00 39 217.20
Std. Error
of Mean
461.23 2.75 697.05 4.14 1 643.00 2 079.20
Median 500.00 15.00 500.00 30.00 20 000.00 35 000.00
Minimum 70.00 3.00 15.00 1.00 0.0 0.0
Maximum 30 000.00 200.00 150 000.00 450.00 100 000.00 250 000.00
Sum 215 666.00 - 580 255.00 - 2 783 000.00 10 471 000.00
Frequency
(Sample
size)
101 101 253 253 115 267
Shadow
economy
activity as
% of
‘official’
income
8.82% 5.85%
Source: own calculations
5The services provided by shadow economy workers, and the services requested by those who
purchase shadow economy work, are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Both tables show differences
in the average amount of income earned in the various jobs and the average amount of money
spent in the various work areas. They also show differences in the frequencies of the different
work/job fields.
Shadow economy workers are mostly engaged for ‘repair work in the house and garden’ and
also for ‘teaching, training and entertainment’. Shadow economy work is mostly purchased
for ‘repair work in the house and garden’, ‘house services’ and ‘garden work’. Both Tables 2
and 3 show that on average the highest income earned a year is in the ‘car delivery service
sector’, with AUS$6089.80 earned by a shadow economy worker and AUS$7498.67 spent
for the service.
In other areas, differences emerge between the estimates in Tables 2 and 3: Shadow economy
workers in the area of ‘service outside the house’ earn on average AUS$2370.91 a year,
while purchasers of this work spend an average of AUS$5370.41. This suggests that those
who work in this area fail to declare the majority of their earnings. The opposite bias occurs
in the area of ‘teaching, training and entertainment’. Purchasers spend on average
AUS$516.66 a year, whereas workers in the same area earn AUS$2381.00.
Besides car delivery services, shadow economy workers earn most in the area of ‘repair in
house and garden’ with an average of AUS$3226.11 a year. The least amount is earned in the
area of ‘farm and other services’ with an average of AUS$500.00 a year.
6Table 2: Services offered by shadow economy workers
Annual income earned in the shadow economy
AUS$
Service Sample
(N)
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
1) Repair work in the
house and garden
18 3 226.11 7 140.23 70 30 000
2) Garden work 7 582.14 649.15 100 2000
3) House services 15 1 123.47 1 877.00 72 6500
4) Service outside
house
11 2 370.91 3 035.34 80 10 000
5) Car delivery
services
5 6 089.80 9 634.35 400 23 000
6) Teaching, training
and entertainment
20 2 381.00 5 190.63 100 22 000
7) Farm and other
services
3 500.00 435.89 200 1000
8) Miscellaneous 13 1 715.38 2 569.00 100 10 000
Total 92 2 249.41 4 822.40 70 30 000
Analysis of variance a
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 1.43E+08 7 20 398 008.45 0.868 0.535
Within Groups 1.972E+09 84 23 493 633.56
Total 2.12E+09 91
aMultiple comparisons were performed comparing each group with all other groups. No
significant difference was found at the 0.05 level of significance.
7Table 3: Services ordered by those who purchase shadow economy work
Annual income spent in the shadow economy
AUS$
Work Area Sample
(N)
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
1) Repair work in the
house and garden
84 1 648.09 5 369.61 20.00 48 000.00
2) Garden work 48 3 692.25 21 588.04 15.00 150 000.00
3) House services 67 1 874.26 4 005.02 20.00 30 800.00
4) Service outside
house
12 5 370.41 15 188.20 90.00 53 500.00
5) Car delivery
services
6 7 498.66 13 847.92 112.00 35 000.00
6) Teaching, training
and entertainment
6 516.66 304.41 150.00 950.00
7) Farm and other
services
12 772.41 1 685.44 70.00 6 000.00
8) Miscellaneous 13 1 067.30 1 158.06 25.00 4 000.00
Total 248 2 326.31 10 906.81 15.00 150 000.00
Analysis of variancea
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 4.83E+08 7 68 976 496.63 0.573 0.778
Within Groups 2.89E+10 240 120 416 502.28
Total 2.94E+10 247
aMultiple comparisons were performed comparing each group with all other groups. No
significant difference was found at the 0.05 level of significance.
8Table 4 shows whether households that are engaged in the shadow economy have different
attitudes to those who are not. Attitudinal research on tax evasion points to the importance of
the perceived likelihood of getting caught (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998; Jackson and
Milliron, 1986) and the defensibility of one’s actions to self and others (Thurman, St. John,
and Riggs, 1984) as motivating factors. These attitudes were assessed by the following two
questions:
(1) Imagine yourself in this situation: You have been paid $5000 cash for work that you
have done outside your regular job. You don’t declare it on your income tax return.
What do you think the chances are that you will get caught?
(2) Why do you think people work for cash-in-hand payments? By cash-in-hand
payments we mean cash money that tax is not paid on.
When examining the responses to question 1 (see Table 4), it is clear that both suppliers and
purchasers engaged in shadow economy activities believe that their chances of being caught
are considerably lower compared to the other respondents. For example, 33.0% of shadow
economy suppliers and 32.4% of those who purchase shadow economy work think the
chance of getting caught is about 0% compared to 15.6% of non-shadow economy workers
and 13.9% of non-shadow economy purchasers. Only 9.6% of shadow economy suppliers
and 8.4% of those who purchase shadow economy work think the ‘chance of getting caught’
is about 100%, in contrast to 20.3% of non-shadow economy workers and 21.5% of non-
shadow economy purchasers.
One possible explanation given by survey respondents as to why they thought people work
for cash-in-hand payments (question 2) is that income taxes are too high. Systematic
differences between those engaged in the shadow economy and those who are not were also
found. However, the differences were not as clear-cut as the differences found for question 1.
Results showed that 37.7% of the shadow economy workers (suppliers) and 23.4% of those
who purchase shadow economy work (purchasers) think that people are engaged in the
shadow economy because income taxes are too high versus 19.4% of non-shadow economy
workers and 19.8% of non-shadow economy purchasers.
Table 4: Attitudes to getting caught and income tax rates among people engaged in shadow economy activities versus those who are
not engaged in shadow economy activities
Shadow economy
workers /suppliers
Shadow economy work
purchasers
Shadow economy
workers/ suppliers
Shadow economy work
purchasers
What do you
think the chances
are that you will
get caught1)
Yes No Sum Yes No Sum
Income tax
too high2)
Yes No Sum Yes No Sum
About 0%3) 33.0%
(38)
15.6%
(283)
16.7%
(321)
32.4%
(89)
13.9%
(229)
16.6%
(318)
Definitely
not
1.8%
(2)
3.1%
(56)
3.0%
(58)
2.6%
(7)
3.2%
(52)
3.1%
(59)
About 25% 20.0%
(23)
15.4%
(279)
15.7%
(302)
17.5%
(48)
15.5%
(259)
15.7
(302)
Unlikely 11.4%
(13)
12.5%
(226)
12.5%
(239)
16.4%
(44)
11.8%
(193)
12.4%
(237)
About 50/50 28.7%
(33)
32.2%
(584)
32.0%
(617)
28.4%
(78)
32.7%
(537)
32.1
(615)
Unsure 13.2%
(15)
17.4%
(313)
17.1%
(328)
12.6%
(34)
17.8%
(292)
17.1%
(326)
About 75% 8.7%
(10)
16.5%
(298)
16.0%
(308)
13.5%
(37)
16.4%
(269)
16.0%
(306)
Probably 36.0%
(41)
47.6%
(859)
46.9%
(300)
45.0%
(121)
47.5%
(779)
47.1%
(900)
Almost certain
(100%)
9.6%
(11)
20.3%
(367)
19.6%
(378)
8.4%
(23)
21.5%
(354)
19.7%
(377)
Definitely 37.7%
(43)
19.4%
(349)
20.4%
(392)
23.4%
(63)
19.8%
(325)
20.3%
(388)
Total 100%
(115)
100%
(1811)
100%
(1926)
100%
(275)
100%
(1643)
100%
(1918)
Total 100%
(114)
100%
(1803)
100%
(1917)
100% 100% 100%
Chi-Square
Test (Pearson)
31.941
d.f. = 4      Sig: 0.000
72.289
d.f. = 4           Sig: 0.000
Chi-
Sq.T.(P.)
22.659
d.f. = 4        Sig: 0.000
9.56
d.f. = 4       Sig: 0.048
Source: own calculations
Explanations:
1) Question: Imagine yourself in this situation. You have been paid $5000 in cash for work that you have done outside your regular job. You don’t declare it on your
income tax return.
2) Question: Why do you think people work for cash-in-hand payments? By cash-in-hand we mean cash money that tax is not paid on.
3) Figures in brackets represent the number of respondents.
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In Tables 5 to 7, the findings of other important attitudinal and socio-demographic variables
are shown. Table 5 presents the findings from those people who are engaged in shadow
economy work and clearly shows that, on average, cash economy workers have considerably
lower ‘official’ incomes than those not working in the shadow economy (mean difference is
AUS$4100 or 85% of a non-cash economy worker’s income). However, this may be
explained by the fact that shadow economy workers are considerably younger than non-
shadow economy workers (average age is 38.3 years versus 48.6 years respectively), with an
average of 10.4 years separating them.
Table 5: Other significant differences between shadow economy suppliers and non-suppliers
Variable/Attitude Shadow
economy
supply
Sample
(N)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean
Difference
t-value1)
Official income
(AUS$’000)
Supply
No supply
115
1724
24.20
28.30
17.60
27.80
-4.10 -2.29*
Age Supply
No supply
117
1838
38.30
48.60
13.40
15.30
-10.40 -8.02**
In conflict with
Tax Office (self)
Supply
No supply
118
1845
2.11
1.99
1.00
1.00
0.12 1.69
In conflict with
Tax Office (other)
Supply
No supply
111
1796
2.18
1.99
1.00
1.00
0.19 2.04*
Has had contact
with Tax Office
Supply
No supply
110
1795
2.30
1.99
1.00
1.00
0.31 3.55**
I should honestly
declare cash
earnings
Supply
No supply
118
1828
3.11
3.59
0.75
0.68
-0.48 -6.81**
I think others
believe they should
honestly declare
cash earnings
Supply
No supply
115
1828
2.45
2.66
0.57
0.61
-0.21 -4.07**
It is smart to work
in the cash
economy
Supply
No supply
118
1813
3.19
2.61
0.98
0.85
0.58 6.34**
Disapproves of
working in the
cash economy
Supply
No supply
118
1808
1.70
2.16
0.78
1.03
-0.45 -6.08**
Has a smart tax
agent
Supply
No supply
82
1169
3.04
2.79
0.74
0.63
0.25 2.95**
1) t-test for equality of means; equal variances not assumed, for further explanation see Table 7.
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Not surprisingly, shadow economy workers have had significantly more contact with the Tax
Office and are closely connected with people who have had conflict with the Tax Office (see
Table 7 for description of the measures used). In addition, compared to non-shadow economy
workers, shadow economy workers believe that they should be much less honest in declaring
cash earnings and they are more likely to believe that others agree with them.
A similar result was found when measuring the attitude ‘it is smart to work in the shadow
economy’. Shadow economy workers endorsed this attitude more strongly than non-shadow
economy workers. Further, in contrast to non-shadow economy workers, shadow economy
workers disapprove much less of others working in the shadow economy. Interestingly, those
involved in the shadow economy are also more likely to have a ‘smart’ tax agent – one who
is creative, seeks out tax loopholes and exploits the grey areas of the law, so in more ways
than one, these people are seeking to reduce their tax obligations.
Table 6 presents the results for those who purchase shadow economy activities compared to
those who do not. It is clear that results of these two groups are similar in some respects. For
instance, when examining the age variable, no significant difference is found between those
who purchase shadow economy work and those who do not (48.45 years versus 47.82 years
respectively). Interestingly, no difference emerged between the two groups in answer to the
attitude question ‘I should honestly declare cash earnings’. This is in contrast to the finding
for the shadow economy suppliers (see Table 5). There was also no difference between
people purchasing shadow economy work and those who do not in relation to the variable
‘has a smart tax agent’.
One important difference found between purchasers and non-purchasers was that those
purchasing shadow economy work had considerably higher incomes than those not
purchasing shadow economy work (on average 50.6% higher). Moreover, purchasers of
shadow economy work differed from non-purchasers with respect to three attitudes:
• purchasers of shadow economy work were more likely to think that other people
believed it was acceptable to earn money in the shadow economy;
• purchasers saw shadow economy workers as smart; and
• purchasers were not about to criticise shadow economy workers for their activities.
12
Table 6: Other significant differences between shadow economy purchasers and non-
purchasers
Variable/
Attitude
Shadow
economy
purchase
Sample
(N)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean
Difference
t-
value1)
Official income
(AUS$’000)
Purchase
No purchase
267
1564
39.21
26.03
33.97
25.48
13.18 6.05**
Age Purchase
No purchase
280
1664
48.45
47.82
13.62
15.67
0.63 0.69
In conflict with
Tax Office (self)
Purchase
No purchase
280
1675
2.13
1.98
1.00
1.00
0.19 3.16**
In conflict with
Tax Office (other)
Purchase
No purchase
272
1626
2.22
1.97
1.00
1.00
0.25 3.72**
Has had contact
with Tax Office
Purchase
No purchase
272
1623
2.17
1.98
1.00
1.00
0.19 3.49**
I should honestly
declare cash
earnings
Purchase
No purchase
276
1661
3.50
3.57
0.77
0.67
-0.07 -1.45
I think others
believe they
should honestly
declare cash
earnings
Purchase
No purchase
278
1659
2.50
2.66
0.59
0.61
-0.16 4.32**
It is smart to work
in the cash
economy
Purchase
No purchase
277
1646
2.86
2.61
0.87
0.87
0.25 4.47**
Disapproves of
working in the
cash economy
Purchase
No purchase
276
1642
1.86
2.18
0.88
1.03
-0.32 -5.47**
Has a smart tax
agent
Purchase
No purchase
210
1033
2.84
2.80
0.63
0.64
-0.04 0.74
1)t-test for equality of means; equal variances not assumed, for further explanation see Table 7.
Table 7: Composition of the attitude variables used in Tables 5 and 6 and Tables 8 to 10→
Part 1
Variable Composition
In conflict with Tax Office
(self)
This measure was a composite of responses to a four-item scale asking if respondent had been audited, fined,
questioned by the Tax Office, or had contested an assessment by the Tax Office. The response categories were:
1 = never in conflict        ➨           2 = once in conflict            ➨            3 = more often
In conflict with Tax Office
(other)
This measure was a composite of responses to a two-item scale asking if some one close to the respondent had
been audited by the Tax Office, or had contested an assessment by the Tax Office. The response categories were:
1 = never in conflict        ➨           2 = once in conflict            ➨            3 = more often
Has had contact with Tax
Office
This measure was a composite of responses to a four-item scale asking if respondent or someone close to the
respondent had requested information from the Tax Office. The response categories were:
1 = no contact        ➨         2         ➨          3          ➨           4         ➨           5 = some contact
I should honestly declare cash
earnings
This measure was a composite of responses to a four-item scale labelled a personal ethical norm of honesty in
taxpaying. The response categories were:
1 = NO!        ➨        2 = no       ➨         3 = don’t know      ➨          4 = yes       ➨         5 = YES!
I think others believe they
should honestly declare cash
earnings
This measure was a composite of responses to a four-item scale labelled a social ethical norm of honesty in
taxpaying. The response categories were:
1 = NO!        ➨        2 = no       ➨       3 = don’t know        ➨         4 = yes       ➨        5 = YES!
It is smart to work in the cash
economy
This measure was a composite of responses to a three-item scale labelled admiration of cash-economy tax evasion.
The response categories were:
1 = highly unlikely      ➨          2         ➨          3          ➨         4         ➨          5 = highly likely
Disapproves of working in the
cash economy
This measure was a composite of responses to a two-item scale labelled willingness to criticise cash economy
workers. The response categories were:
1 = highly unlikely      ➨          2        ➨          3          ➨          4         ➨          5 = highly likely
Has a smart tax agent This measure was a composite of responses to a three-item scale asking respondents how much priority they
would place on finding a tax agent who could use loopholes in the law and schemes to reduce the tax they have to
pay. The response categories were:
1 = strongly disagree     ➨     2 = disagree    ➨    3 =  neither    ➨   4 = agree    ➨   5 = strongly agree
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Table 7: Composition of the attitude variables used in Tables 5 and 6 and Tables 8 to 10
Part 2
Variable Composition
Moral obligation to pay tax This measure was a composite of responses to an eight-item scale asking if respondent feels committed to pay
tax. The response categories were:
1 = strongly disagree                                         ➨                                    5 = strongly agree
Working for cash-in-hand to
reduce government costs
This measure was a composite of responses to a three-item scale asking respondent if people work for tax-free
cash-in-hand because income tax is too high, because they want to have more disposable income, or because they
want to avoid paying tax. The response categories were:
1 = definitely not                  ➨           3 = unsure            ➨                                5 = definitely
Paying cash-in-hand to reduce
government costs
This measure was a composite of responses to a two-item scale asking respondent if people get paid cash-in-hand
to reduce costs and to avoid red tape. The response categories were:
1 = definitely not                  ➨           3 = unsure            ➨                                5 = definitely
Wanting to have an honest
tax agent
This measure was a composite of responses to a two-item scale asking respondent how much of a priority s/he
would place on choosing an honest tax agent who would not take any risks. The response categories were:
1 = low                                  ➨           3 = medium           ➨                                5 = top
Being unable to get ahead
because of the tax system
This measure was a composite of responses to a three-item scale asking respondent if s/he would be better off
working less, if paying tax removes the incentive to earn more, and if s/he can't get ahead because of the tax
system. The response categories were:
1 = strongly disagree                                         ➨                                    5 = strongly agree
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In general, the results demonstrate that there are significant differences between the attitudes
of people engaged in the shadow economy and those who are not. The next section will
attempt to explain what influences people to become engaged in the shadow economy.
3. A preliminary explanation of the factors which motivate individuals to work in the shadow
economy
For an individual to be engaged in shadow economy activities (either as a purchaser or
supplier), several factors play a role. A number of variables have been hypothesised below
that could influence the decision:
1) The income situation. It would be expected that as income increases, the purchase for
and supply of shadow economy activities would be less; hence a negative correlation
seems likely. This hypothesis is based on an assumption that as income increases, the
need to operate in the shadow economy decreases. However, human aspiration may drive
this relationship more than income adequacy. It could be the case that shadow economy
workers compare their income situation with their neighbours, want to have a better life,
and hence increase their shadow economy activities. Thus a positive correlation would
also seem plausible.
Research findings on tax evasion more generally reflect the ambiguity conveyed in
Hypothesis 1 (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998; Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Mixed
results have led some researchers to turn their attention to subjective assessments of
income adequacy and compliance costs as outlined below in hypothesis 2.
2) If people feel burdened by the demands of the state (for example, high income tax,
red tape, other costs, lack of disposable income) they will be more likely to be engaged in
shadow economy activities.
The burden of taxation has been a standard explanation for the rise of the shadow
economy (Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan, 1995), but empirical findings in support of this
assertion are far from conclusive (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Often this hypothesis has
been tested using objective indicators such as marginal tax rates without considering the
importance of taxpayer perception in understanding taxpayer motives. Behaviour is more
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likely to be affected if taxpayers perceive themselves as carrying a burden, that is,
through an awareness that they have insufficient disposable income, that they are paying
a lot of tax and that they have extra costs associated with meeting their tax obligation.
The attitudinal measures of perceptions of tax burden is described in Table 7.
3) People engaged in shadow economy activities know that if they are caught by the
authorities they will be punished; hence people who believe that the likelihood of being
detected is high will be less likely to engage in shadow economy activities.
Perception of the likelihood of detection has been one of the most consistent predictors of
tax evasion (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998; Jackson and Milliron, 1986).
4) If people feel a high moral obligation to pay their taxes, they will be less likely to be
engaged in shadow economy activities.
Along with perception of the likelihood of detection, feeling a moral obligation to pay tax
has emerged as a major factor in understanding tax compliance (Grasmick and Bursik,
1990; Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967). Having internalised the
belief that paying tax is the right thing to do, a person can be said to have a conscience
about paying tax. Once activated, conscience serves as a self-regulatory mechanism that
delivers voluntary compliance (Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, and Braithwaite, 2001).
5) Those people who are in conflict with the Tax Office are more likely to be engaged in
shadow economy activities. The same holds for those who have a lot of contact with the
Tax Office.
Research findings on contact with a tax enforcement agency have produced mixed results
(Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998; Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Most of this work is
based on the Internal Revenue Service in the United States so a comparison of the
findings to other tax authorities needs to be approached with caution. In theory, it could
be expected that individuals who had frequent contact with a regulatory agency, and who
had conflict with that agency, would include people who are engaged in shadow economy
activities. From the perspective of effective regulation, it could be argued that a tax
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authority that was targeting risk satisfactorily should have more contact and conflict with
those at the margins or beyond the bounds of legally sanctioned behaviour.
6) Those who feel they should honestly declare all cash earnings will be less likely to be
engaged in shadow economy activities. Also, those who believe that other people feel the
same way, that is, that they should honestly declare all shadow economy activities, will
be less likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities.
Personal and social norms are increasingly being examined as explanatory factors in the
context of tax compliance (Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan, 1995). An individual’s
understanding of what he or she should do in a particular situation, that is, should they
declare all cash earnings, describes a personal norm. The individual’s understanding of
what others believe about this same practice, that is, do others believe they should declare
all their cash earnings, represents a social norm. Personal and social norms are expected
to positively reinforce each other, but need not be of the same magnitude in a community.
In Australia, the personal norm of honestly declaring cash earnings is stronger than the
corresponding social norm (see Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns, and Graham, 2001).
Individuals are most likely to say that they personally believe in being honest about
declaring all cash earnings, but they don’t think other people share this view. Therefore,
both personal and social norms are tested as predictors of cash economy activities.
7) Those who think that people engaged in shadow economy activities are smart will be
more likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities themselves.
Personal and social norms represent community perceptions of what is socially
acceptable behaviour. They play a central part in shaping an individual’s identity. Just as
influential are the actions of groups that the person respects and admires. Such groups
may not follow socially accepted customs. Nevertheless, they may offer an identity that
appeals to people, particularly those people who are frustrated with more socially
accepted ways of operating (Sutherland and Cressey, 1978). Prerequisites for identifying
with a group engaged in cash economy activities and subsequently taking part in such
activities oneself, are likely to be respect for group members and loyalty to that group
(Tyler and Blader, 2000). Hypothesis 7 addresses the issue of respect through the belief
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that cash economy workers are smart. Hypothesis 8 addresses the issue of loyalty through
being unwilling to criticise or blow the whistle on those working in the cash economy.
8) Those people who disapprove of others working in the shadow economy will be less
likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities.
While the variables presented in hypotheses 1 to 8 have been specifically proposed, other
factors such as age, education, occupation, gender, marital status, and number of children
may also predict whether people become involved in the shadow economy.
Table 8 presents the results of a logistic regression which attempts to explain whether or not
an individual will engage in the shadow economy. The dependent variables are as follows:
1 working in shadow economy activities (suppliers, n=78)
0 not working in shadow economy activities (non-suppliers, n=1154)
and
1 purchasing shadow economy activities (purchasers, n=200)
0 not purchasing shadow economy activities (non-purchasers,
n=1025)
The independent variables are the factors mentioned in Hypotheses (1) to (8) in addition to
the socio-demographic variables listed in Table 8.
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Table 8: Results of a logistic regression for people engaged in shadow economy activities
Part 1
Independent Variables Estimated coefficients
b value (Wald test)
Attributes Dependent Var:
Suppliers of
shad.ec.act. a
Dependent Var:
Purchasers of
shad.ec.act. b
Moral obligation to pay tax
1=strongly disagree         5=strongly agree
 0.06 (0.05)  0.21 (1.74)
Chances of getting caught
1=about zero %               5=about 100 %
-0.23 (4.02)* -0.28 (15.86)**
Working for cash-in-hand to reduce
government costs
1=definitely not                5=definitely
-0.08  (0.11)  0.32  (3.90)*
Paying cash-in-hand to reduce government
costs
1=definitely not               5=definitely
 0.34  (3.62) -0.28  (7.49)**
In conflict with the Tax Office (self)
1 = never in conflict       3 = mostly in conflict
0.46  (6.20)*  0.02  (0.02)
In conflict with the Tax Office (other)
1 = never in conflict       3 = mostly in conflict
0.04  (0.08)  0.09  (0.78)
Has had contact with the Tax Office
1 = little contact             3 = most contact
 0.24  (1.90)  0.03  (0.09)
I should honestly declare cash earnings
     1 = NO!!                     5 = YES!!
-0.67  (8.78)** -0.11  (0.61)
I think others believe they should honestly
declare cash earnings
     1 = NO!!                     5 = YES!!
-0.50  (4.20)* -0.16  (1.17)
It is smart to work in the cash economy
     1 = highly unlikely     5 = highly likely
 0.09  (0.13)  0.44 (12.90)**
Disapproves of work in the cash economy
     1 = highly unlikely     5 = highly likely
-0.17  (0.81)  0.01 (0.01)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
a Prior probability of classification was set to 0.06 according to the sample distribution.
b Prior probability of classification was set to 0.144 according to the sample distribution.
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Table 8: Results of a logistic regression for people engaged in shadow economy activities
Part 2
Independent Variables Estimated coefficients
b value (Wald test)
Income and socio-demographics Dependent Var:
Suppliers of
shad.ec.act.
Dependent Var:
Purchasers of
shad.ec.act.
Personal income per thousand AUS$ -0.02  (8.82)**  0.01  (8.50)**
Age -0.03  (7.34)**  0.01  (0.52)
Educationa
(1.  Leaving, year10)
 2.  Matriculation
 3.  Trade, nursing diploma
 4.  Diploma course
 5.  University, tertiary
 6.  Post graduate
8.25
 0.84  (3.16)
 0.99  (3.90)*
 1.37  (7.21)**
 1.35  (6.11)*
 1.21  (2.08)
7.41
0.31  (0.99)
 0.45  (1.88)
 0.82  (6.34)*
 0.68  (4.26)*
 0.78  (3.69)
Occupationa
(1.  Professionals)
 2.  Managers
 3.  Associate professionals
 4.  Trade clerical
 5.  Intermediate trade clerical
 6.  Intermediate production, transport
 7.  Elementary clerical
 8.  Labourer
9.26
-0.24  (0.16)
-0.14  (0.07)
 0.87  (3.73)
 0.24  (0.26)
 0.11  (0.02)
 0.79  (1.75)
-0.18  (0.06)
10.39
-0.41  (2.02)
-0.21  (0.54)
-0.13  (0.18)
-0.48  (2.50)
-0.93  (3.42)
-1.82  (5.77)*
-0.64  (1.43)
Gender
Female = 0, male = 1
0.83  (7.25)** -0.38  (3.90)*
Marital status
Not married = 0, married = 1
0.42 (1.58)  0.83 (12.28)**
For whom are you workinga
(1.  Private company)
 2.   University, government
 3.   Own business
6.71*
-0.64  (3.53)
 0.43  (1.38)
5.33
0.01  (0.01)
 0.54  (4.68)*
How many children do you have living with
you at home
-0.13 (1.02) -0.02 (0.04)
Child support
No child support = 0, child support = 1
-0.03  (0.01) -0.57 (1.30)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
aThe first response category was omitted in the formation and calculation of the dummy
variables but can be found in brackets for explanatory purposes.
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Table 8: Logistic regression results
Part 3
Classification table for shadow economy supply activities
Predicted
Supply economy activity
Observed No Yes
Percentage
Correct
Shadow. ec.       No
                           Yes
857
15
297
63
74.3
80.8
Overall Percentage 74.7
Nagelkerke R2 = .27
Chi-square = 130.57**
Classification table for shadow economy purchase activities
Predicted
Purchase economy activity
Observed No Yes
Percentage
Correct
Shadow ec.         No
                           Yes
631
45
394
155
61.6
77.5
Overall Percentage 64.2
Nagelkerke R = .21
Chi-square = 163.41**
Logistic regression - dependent variables:
1) People working in the shadow economy (suppliers) = 1
People not working in the shadow economy (non-suppliers)  = 0
2) People purchasing shadow economy activities (purchasers) = 1
People not purchasing shadow economy activities (non-purchasers) = 0
If we examine the overall explanatory validity of these two logistic regressions, we get a
Nagelkerke R2 of 0.27 for supplying shadow economy activity and R2 of 0.21 for purchasing
shadow economy activity; that is 27% and 21% of the variance of the dependent variables are
explained, respectively, by the predictors. For those who work in the shadow economy, we
can correctly predict 80.8% of cases, and 74.3% of cases for those not working in the shadow
economy. For those who purchase cash economy work, we can correctly predict 77.5% and
61.6% of those not purchasing cash economy work. Overall, for shadow economy suppliers
we can predict 74.7% of all cases correctly, and 64.2% for shadow economy purchasers.
While these results are promising, the regression models must be improved to raise predictive
capacity for shadow economy workers and those who purchase services.
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If we now examine the independent variables and their relationship to the dependent variable
of interest, some hypotheses are confirmed while others not. The variables ‘moral obligation
to pay taxes’ and ‘disapproval of cash economy work’ had no statistically significant
influence on shadow economy supply or demand. In contrast, the variable ‘chances of getting
caught’ did have the expected statistically significant influence on shadow economy workers
and those who purchase shadow economy work: those engaged in the shadow economy
estimated their chances of being caught as lower than non-participants.
The likelihood of working in the cash economy was also lower if one accepted the personal
norm of being honest in declaring cash earnings, as well as the social norm of perceiving
others as feeling the same way. Although these variables did not affect demand, it is
interesting that purchasers of cash economy work thought of cash economy workers as smart
operators.
Having had conflict with the Tax Office was associated with working in the cash economy,
but not with purchasing shadow economy work. Believing that government demands were
excessive also played a role, but in an unexpected way. Purchasers were more likely to deny
that they purchased cash economy work so that they could reduce costs and avoid
government red tape. They were more likely to attribute cash economy activity to workers
believing that their tax was too high, that they were lacking disposable income, and wanting
to avoid paying tax. If anything, they tended to blame purchasers for wanting to cut costs,
although the b coefficient was just short of statistical significance at the 0.05 level (p =
0.055). These data suggest that a process of ‘neutralisation’ as described by Thurman, St.
John, and Riggs (1984) may be in play here, with each group blaming the other for their own
participation in illegal activities. Further work is being planned to unravel the social
processes leading to these results.
An increase in income appeared to reduce shadow economy supply (that is, work in the
shadow economy decreases), but increased the purchase of shadow economy activities—a
result not consistent with our income hypothesis. The results also show that as people aged,
they tended to work less in the shadow economy. Men worked more in the shadow economy
than women (statistically significant) but women purchased more shadow economy activities
(statistically significant). Those who were married were more likely to be purchasers in the
shadow economy. The number of children one had and whether one had to pay child support
23
had no influence on shadow economy activities. There was some evidence that self-employed
people and those with their own businesses were more likely to be engaged in the cash
economy, but the results were surprisingly weak when other variables were entered into the
equation. Similarly, people in some educational categories (for example, trade, diploma or
university qualifications) were more likely to be engaged in cash economy activities, but
overall, the effects for education and occupation were not significant.
Table 9 explains which variables predict the amount of cash money earned in the shadow
economy while Table 10 explains which variables predict the amount of cash money spent in
the shadow economy. For these analyses, the same variables were used as in the logistic
regressions with four additional variables (see Table 7 for a description of these variables).
The first, wanting an honest tax agent, was introduced because tax agents are more likely to
be useful to cash economy participants as the amount of money involved increases. The
prediction was that engagement in the cash economy would be negatively correlated with
wanting an honest tax agent. The second and third variables measured satisfaction with one’s
material well-being, to complement the objective measure of income that had already been
included in previous analyses. Finally, the model included the type of work done in the
shadow economy. In each case, for suppliers and purchasers, the ordinary least squares
regression analysis was based on the sub-sample who were active in the shadow economy.
To preserve degrees of freedom, the final models contained a subset of variables that best
contributed to explaining variation in the amount of money earned and spent in the shadow
economy.
To maximise comparability between the regression models for suppliers and purchasers the
following were selected as the most useful common predictors: the socio-demographic
variables of income, number of children, education and employment sector, and the social-
psychological variables of wanting an honest tax agent and being unable to get ahead because
of the tax system.
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Table 9: Regression (OLS) results predicting amount of cash income among shadow
economy suppliers from a set of best predictors (N = 118)
Independent Variables B value beta value t value
Official income 59.92 .24 2.96**
How many children 592.57 .16 1.95*
Educationa
(1.  Leaving, year 10)
 2.  Matriculation
 3.  Trade, nursing diploma
 4.  Diploma course
 5.  University, tertiary
 6.  Post graduate
-2293.62
-3396.06
-1827.56
-2508.20
-3274.09
-.23
-.30
-.18
-.24
-.16
-1.73
-2.49*
-1.40
-1.75
-1.56
For whom are you workinga
(1.  Private company)
 2.   University, government
 3.   Own business
59.57
2403.22
.01
.22
0.06
2.52*
Wanting to have an honest tax agent -1840.46 -.33 -3.97**
Being unable to get ahead because of the tax
system
66.60 .01 0.16
aThe first response category was omitted in the formation and calculation of the dummy
variables but can be found in brackets for explanatory purposes.
R2  = .32; F = 4.52**
Higher cash earnings were reported by those having more children, a higher official income,
less education, and being self-employed and the owner of a business. Those earning more in
the cash economy also wanted a tax agent who was less than honest. The overall F-test was
statistically significant, F=4.52, p <0.001, although only 32% (R2 = 0.319) of the variation in
amount of cash money earned could be explained by these variables together.
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Table 10 presents the results for the money spent on shadow economy activities. Official
income is positively related to the amount of money spent on shadow economy activities, as
is feeling materially disadvantaged by the tax system, and having less education. Spending
money in the cash economy is also related to not wanting an honest tax agent. Only 15% (R2
= 0.146) of the variation (see Table 10) in the amount of money spent in the shadow
economy could be explained, although again the model was statistically significant (F = 4.21,
p < 0.001). Given that the overall fit is poor, both regressions need to be improved before any
firm conclusions can be made about the results.
Table 10: Regression (OLS) results predicting amount of cash income among shadow
economy purchasers from a set of best predictors (N = 283)
Independent Variables B value beta value t value
Official income 69.30 0.22 3.71**
How many children 749.37 0.09 1.49
Educationa
(1.  Leaving, year10)
 2.  Matriculation
 3.  Trade, nursing diploma
 4.  Diploma course
 5.  University, tertiary
 6.  Post Graduate
-5042.18
-5145.08
-5674.62
-5329.79
-4812.43
-0.19
-0.17
-0.21
-0.23
-0.15
-2.43*
-2.33*
-2.70**
-2.66**
-1.99*
For whom are you workinga
(1.  Private company)
 2.   University, government
 3.   Own business
-1121.82
-1685.29
-0.05
-0.06
-0.77
-1.01
Wanting to have an honest tax agent -2056.16 -0.13 -2.15*
Being unable to get ahead because of the
tax system
1550.49 0.14 2.50*
a The first response category was omitted in the formation and calculation of the dummy
variables but can be found in brackets for explanatory purposes.
R2  = .15; F = 4.21**
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4. A preliminary attempt to calculate aggregate figures of the Australian shadow
economy6
Section 2 presented income figures of individuals who work in the shadow economy. A
preliminary attempt can be made to use these income figures to calculate an aggregated
figure of the shadow economy income earned in Australia. The procedure and results of this
attempt are shown in Table 11 (part 1 and 2). It should be noted that in order to estimate an
aggregated figure of the shadow economy in Australia, a number of assumptions have to be
made. These assumptions include how many people are working in the shadow economy,
how one treats the unemployed and how one treats those who retire early. Consider the
officially employed workforce first. By grouping them using Australian Bureau of Statistics
categories (such as labourers, managers and administrators), and then assuming that they are
engaged in shadow economy work, an overall figure of AUS$17.563 billion or 2.86% of
gross national income7 (GNI) being earned through the shadow economy can be estimated.
However, this figure does not include the unemployed or those who have retired early (55 to
65 years of age).
                                                
6 One of the few and latest studies estimating the underground economy in Australia has been done by
Christopher Bajada (1999). Bajada uses the currency demand approach, over the period 1967 – 1995, not the
micro estimates method used here to estimate the Australian shadow economy.
7 Gross national income (GNI) represents the sum of all income of residents arising from economic activity. It is
equivalent to gross domestic product (GDP) less the consumption of fixed capital less net income paid overseas.
It is also equivalent to domestic factor incomes plus indirect taxes, less subsidies, less net income paid overseas.
(Castles, 1990 p8).
Table 11: Some basic calculations of an aggregate figure of the shadow economy in Australia for the year 2000
Part 1
Questionnaire Sample
Occupation Number of
people
working in the
shadow
economy
(1)
Number of
people not
working in
the shadow
economy
(2)
(1)/(2)
in %
Mean income
earned in the
shadow
economy
(AUS$)
Number of
officially
employed
people
(‘000s)
Total
amount of
shadow
income
earned in
‘000 (AUS$)
Total
shadow
economy
income
(%)
Managers and
administrators
7 185 0.04 1 267.14 643.50 815 404.59
Professionals 18 363 0.05 1 535.00 1 646.20 2 526 917.00
Associated
professionals
10 206 0.05 3 670.00 1 037.90 3 809 093.00
Trade, clerical 24 217 0.11 3 478.13 1 588.00 5 523 270.44
Intermediate trade,
clerical
12 278 0.04 1 360.00 1 599.90 2 175 864.00
Intermediate
production transport
4 123 0.03 1 937.50 776.70 1 504 856.25
Elementary clerical 8 108 0.07 931.25 911.20 848 555.00
Labourers 4 94 0.04 424.75 846.10 359 380.98
Total 14 603.77 9 049.50 17 563 341.26 2.86%
Average 1 825.47
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Table 11: Some basic calculations of an aggregate figure of the shadow economy in Australia for the year 2000
Part 2
Variable Number of
unemployed
and early
retired
pensioners
Mean Y
Shadow
Ec.
(AUS$) 1)
Mean Y
Shadow Ec.
DOUBLE
(AUS$)
Mean Y
Shadow
Ec.
TRIPLE
(AUS$)
Shadow economy
income of the
unemployed and
early retired
pensioners
(AUS$)
Shadow economy
income of the
unemployed and
early retired
pensioners
DOUBLE
(AUS$)
Shadow economy
income of the
unemployed and early
retired pensioners
TRIPLE
(AUS$)
5 625 700.00 2 135.31 4 270.62 6 405.93 12 012 613 000.00 24 025 227 000.00 36 037 840 000.00
Shad. Ec. Y
of the
workers
+17 563 341 000.00 +17 563 341 000.00 +17 563 341 000.00
Total Shad.
Ec. Y
29 575 954 000.00 41 588 568 000.00 53 601 181 000.00
Shad.Ec.Y in % of
GNI
Shad.Ec.Y in % of
GNI
Shad.Ec.Y in % of
GNI
4.81% 6.77% 8.73%
1)Value from Table 1 was taken because it represents a larger sample of shadow economy suppliers (101 versus 87 from Table 11 part 1).
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By combining the unemployed and those who have retired early, there are 5 625 700 people
who could potentially work and earn in the shadow economy. This poses a problem when
trying to estimate how much these people can work and earn. As these groups have more
time on their hands, they have the ability to work more. Hence, the absolute minimum figure
they could earn is the same as the shadow economy income earned by those who are
officially employed. These two groups might also earn double or triple the amount of cash
income than those who are officially employed - estimates are presented in Table 11. All
three of these possibilities may be plausible. Assuming that the unemployed and those who
have retired early have the same shadow economy income as those who are officially
employed, an aggregated figure of AUS$29.575 billion (or 4.81% of official GNI) being
earned by these two groups can be calculated. Assuming they earn double the cash income of
those officially employed, an aggregate figure of AUS$41.588 billion (or 6.77% of official
GNI) can be obtained. Finally, assuming these two groups of people earn triple the amount of
cash income of those officially employed, we get an aggregate figure of AUS$53.601 billion
(or 8.75% of official GNI).8
To get an overall indication of how much is being earned in the Australian shadow economy,
add the amount of shadow economy income earned from small and medium sized enterprises
to these aggregated figures. An overall estimate of the shadow economy work being
conducted in Australia was calculated using the currency demand approach (see Schneider &
Enste, 2000) and the value was found to be approximately 14.2% of GNI. While the
aggregate results presented in this section seem plausible, it should be noted that the
assumptions made could be criticised and the results should be accepted with caution.
                                                
8 Bajada's estimate of  the size of the underground economy in percent of GDP for the year 1995 was 15.5% and
for the year 1994, 15.2%. Using a different method his estimates are much larger than the one obtained here for
the year 1999/2000.
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Summary and policy conclusions
This paper provides an explanation of the individual behaviours which motivate people to
engage in the cash economy. Socio-demographic variables were important, along with threat
of legal sanctions and perceptions of social norms. The findings support the conclusion that
Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan (1995) reached on the basis of their experimental work: There is
considerable diversity in the behaviour of taxpayers motivated by ‘myriad factors … that go
much beyond the standard economics-of-crime approach’ (p. 15).
Overall, the results presented in this paper showed that a shadow economy worker earned, on
average, AUS$2135.31 in 2000 and households spent AUS$2293.00 for shadow economy
activities in 2000. Results also showed that people engaged in shadow economy work as a
supplier or purchaser are convinced that the probability of being caught is considerably lower
than those not engaged in such activities. In addition, involvement in the cash economy is
associated with views about tax being too high, and red tape and government charges being
cumbersome. Interestingly, purchasers tended to attribute these motives to suppliers, and
suppliers to a lesser extent, to purchasers, but neither group owned these attitudes themselves.
Those working in the shadow economy were less likely to place importance on being honest
when declaring their cash earnings, while purchasers thought shadow economy workers were
smart and should not be criticised for their activities. The results also showed that if others
are seen to be supportive of the shadow economy then this is likely to increase such activities
(that is, ‘if everyone else does it, I might as well do it too’). The above findings were
supported empirically with a logistic regression analysis when using the dichotomous
dependent variable (not engaged =0, or engaged =1, in the shadow economy).
Finally, by using the data collected in the survey, an overall aggregate figure was calculated
to estimate the degree of income earned in the cash economy in Australia for the year 2000. It
was estimated that between 4.81% and 8.8% of GNI was earned through these illegal
activities. Overall, it should be noted that this paper presents preliminary findings from the
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey and should only be seen as an initial
explanation of the motivating factors responsible for why people engage in shadow economy
activities.
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